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1. Introduction 
In December 2006, shareholders of the Apple Company were relieved to find that the 
iconic chief executive, Steve Jobs, was largely exonerated from blame in the backdating of 
employee stock options of the company. Option backdating is the practice of using 
hindsight to change the grant dates of current options to dates in the past. Because of 
accounting conventions and tax considerations, employee stock options are generally 
granted at-the-money, i.e., the exercise price is set equal to the market price. If options are 
backdated, in fact the exercise price is lowered by choosing a date in the past with a lower 
stock price. This practice is not illegal on itself, as long as it is revealed to shareholders, but 
it can be controversial as the Apple case shows.  
Yermack (1997), the precursor of the literature on option backdating, identified a 
pattern of abnormal stock price returns around executive stock option grants in the sense 
that there were abnormally high returns immediately after these options were granted. 
Other than pure luck and/or the ability to forecast stock prices, firms' timing of option 
grants or firm-related announcements, or "springloading", is the most likely explanation for 
these abnormal returns. Several subsequent studies (e.g., Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; 
Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001; Lie, 2005; Heron and Lie, 2007) further show that stock returns 
are abnormally low before the grant dates.
1
 Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2007) argue 
that the stock options in question are more likely backdated and that the firms are not likely 
timing grants and/or backdating information flow to the market. In other words, with 
hindsight, the grant dates of current options are changed to dates with lower strike prices. 
                                                 
1
 The combination of low abnormal returns before the backdating and high abnormal returns after is often 
referred to as the “V”-shape for option backdating. 
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Heron and Lie (2009) estimate that 13.6% of all top executive (CEO) option grants 
from 1996 to 2005 are backdated or otherwise manipulated. This estimate is 18.9% for 
unscheduled at-the-money grants, but it has decreased significantly since the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).
2
 At the firm level, 29.2% of their firms are estimated 
to have backdated grants, though not all grants have been backdated.  
Firms often argue that option backdating is essential to restore incentives and to retain 
talented executives. Both arguments are backed up by empirical research: for example, 
Fang (2010) finds evidence for the retention explanation, and the research of Gao and 
Mahmudi (2011) supports the incentive hypothesis. However, others have argued that by 
resetting existing option grants to a date with a favourable price, executives are in fact 
rewarded for poor performance, which can be viewed as an example of managerial 
entrenchment or rent-seeking. Studies of e.g. Collins et al. (2009) and Bizjak et al. (2009) 
relate option backdating to inferior corporate governance, also known as the agency 
hypothesis. The anticipation of possible option backdating is detrimental to managerial 
incentives, i.e., executives profit from upside risk (when options become in-the-money) 
while enjoying protection from downside risk (when out-of-the-money options are 
backdated). The empirical findings of studies that test the agency hypothesis go in different 
directions: Collins et al. (2009) find that option backdating results from weak governance, 
whereas Bizjak et al. (2009) do not find such a relation. 
                                                 
2
 On August 29, 2002, this Act was passed to address issues such as independent auditors, corporate 
governance, internal control assessment, and financial disclosure. Among others, firms are required to report 
their executive stock option grants within two business days to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), which makes this information available to the public within one day. Previously, reports of such grants 
were not due until 45 days after the firm's fiscal year-end and were to be announced to the shareholders in the 
proxy statement for the following year's annual meeting. 
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Despite the fact that there are a number of empirical studies on the causes of 
backdating, there is no conclusive evidence as of yet. For example, the literature is divided 
on whether or not option backdating is associated with weak governance. In addition, the 
empirical research tends to be fragmented with different studies focusing on different 
aspects of the cause for backdating. The goal of this paper, therefore, is to compare the 
competing explanations for backdating, i.e. incentive alignment, retention, and agency 
considerations. By combining proxies for all three different hypotheses in one cross-section 
and by considering different variables for the agency hypothesis, we aim to present an 
extensive analysis comparing the relative strength of each of these three explanations.  
We employ a sample of 6,830 stock option grants issued to the top executives in the 
Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 companies between 1999 and 2007. Following Heron and 
Lie (2009), we estimate the likelihood of option backdating on the basis of the assumption 
that, in the absence of backdating, the distributions of stock price returns during the month 
immediately before/after the grants should be similar. Namely, significant (positive) 
abnormal return differences imply the existence of some kind of grant date manipulation. 
We calculate abnormal returns as the difference between the stock returns of the granting 
firm and the returns predicted by the Fama-French three-factor model. We primarily focus 
on grants whose abnormal return differences rank above 90% in the sample distribution. 
In terms of the determinants, we use a linear probit model to estimate the likelihood of 
option backdating. Overall, we find strong evidence for the retention hypothesis because 
smaller, younger and less profitable firms tend to backdate more than other firms. As 
expected, the likelihood for backdating is higher for high-technology firms because of the 
more competitive labour market. The incentive hypothesis is also confirmed because 
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backdating occurs more for options that are out-of-the-money. Despite the negative press 
that employee stock option backdatings often receive, our evidence does not support the 
agency hypothesis. In particular, we find that companies that backdate options have better 
protection for minority shareholders compared to companies that do not backdate. 
Therefore, it seems that employee stock option backdating is associated with better rather 
than with weak corporate governance. The only minor confirmation that we find for the 
agency hypothesis is the fact that option backdating companies have a larger percentage of 
inside directors on the board. This result confirms an earlier finding by Collins et al. (2009). 
Our findings still hold after controlling for industry and year fixed effects. 
Although we find evidence that incentive-realignment considerations influence the 
decision to backdate options, whether the intention to engage in option backdating is 
materialized ex-post matters more. In addition to the legal ramifications, this question has 
important implications for shareholders.
3
 For that purpose, we investigate the relation 
between option backdating and subsequent firm performance. We use the treatment-effects 
model and find no relation between backdating and operating performance after controlling 
for drivers for backdating. In other words, option backdating is not capable of repairing 
mismatched incentives and is not detrimental, either. The selection attributes resemble the 
option repricing mechanism. Again, there is no evidence for ineffective governance or 
executive entrenchment. Collectively, these findings suggest that firms engage in option 
backdating more for retaining valuable employees and less for restoring incentives 
effectively. Besides, there is no evidence that non- and backdating firms perform differently 
in the long-term market performance. 
                                                 
3
 For instance, Narayanan et al. (2007) and Bernile and Jarrell (2009) document negative abnormal stock 
returns around public disclosure of backdating-related practices despite no direct linkage to cash flow 
consequences. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related 
literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample construction, data 
collection, and methodology applied for estimation. Section 4 describes the estimation and 
testing results. Section 5 summarizes the findings and presents concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Option Repricing and Option Backdating 
The terms of stock options are set at the time of the grant, but they are sometimes subject to 
changes before these options expire. The most common such change is option repricing, i.e., 
the strike prices are lowered after a decline in stock price. Usually, the new strike prices are 
30%-40% lower than the old ones, often with an extension of the option maturity. Formally, 
option repricing is executed either by replacing the existing options with new grants at 
more favourable terms or by rewriting the terms of the existing option grants (Chidambaran 
and Prabhala, 2003). Option repricing was commonly used among firms in the 1990s. Like 
option backdating, the repricing phenomenon has received considerable attention in the 
press and was criticized by outsiders because it is viewed as an example of managerial 
entrenchment. Facing the intense pressure from active institutional investors, the regulatory 
agency, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) was forced to take action in 
1998 and required firms to expense the estimated value of the repriced grants. Since then, 
the practice of repricing largely disappeared (Carter and Lynch, 2003). For example, the 
number of all senior executives having options repriced dropped 70% in 1999 (65% for 
CEOs).
4
 
                                                 
4
 Data source: the Compustat (ExecuComp). 
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Option backdating shares similar features with option repricing. An option is viewed as 
backdated when its grant date is set "retroactively", to a date with a more favourable stock 
price, before a rise in stock price, usually at the bottom of a steep drop. Therefore, the 
similarity between option repricing and option backdating mainly emerges from the fact 
that, for both practices, the strike price of a grant is reset to be significantly lower. However, 
the two approaches use different "tools": option repricing resets the strikes directly whereas 
option backdating resets the grant date, which indirectly changes the strikes. These shared 
characteristics suggest that the typical explanations for option repricing seem to provide a 
plausible rationale for option backdating. 
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
2.2.1. The Retention Hypothesis 
Firms, particularly in the high-technology industry, often explicitly state that retaining 
talented executives is the main reason for repricing option grants. Typically, executives 
hold many unvested option grants, which are forfeited upon voluntary departure. Hence, 
these options maintain their retentive power as long as they are not too much 
out-of-the-money (Scholes, 1991; Mehran and Yermack, 1997). Without repricing, the 
costs of unexpected executive departures can be substantial. Empirical studies show that 
option repricing is associated with lower subsequent voluntary executive turnover (Carter 
and Lynch, 2001; Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003; Chen, 2004). 
We hypothesize that option backdating, just like option repricing, serves the purpose of 
retaining valuable executives. Fang (2010) uses a sample of 117 backdating firms identified 
by the Wall Street Journal (with 344 pair-matched firm-year observations) and finds that 
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younger and quickly growing firms in a more competitive labor market tend to backdate 
options. She further links backdating to performance, and the univariate analysis in her 
paper shows that these firms outperform their matched counterparts before and after 
backdating. She argues that these results provide evidence that option backdating is used 
mainly for retaining valuable employees, making it less subject to agency issues. In 
addition, Armstrong and Larcker (2009) provide some behavioral explanations,
5
 other than 
a tax-based rationale (Dhaliwal et al., 2009), for this practice. Formally, our Retention 
Hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Firms backdate options to retain talented executives. 
We use the following proxies to test the Retention Hypothesis: 
 Firm Size and Firm Age: we measure firm size by using the market value of a firm's 
equity. We estimate firm age by calculating the difference between the first year in 
which the firm has data in Compustat and the option grant year. Consistent with the 
option repricing literature (e.g., Chance et al., 2000; Brenner et al., 2000; Carter and 
Lynch, 2001; Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003), we expect that smaller and 
younger firms have a higher tendency for option backdating for retention purposes. 
 Growth Opportunity: to estimate growth opportunity, we first calculate the market 
value of assets, i.e., the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock 
less the sum of book value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes. 
Then, we divide this market value of assets by the book value (the so-called Q ratio). 
When a firm faces high growth prospects, it is vital to attract and retain the top 
                                                 
5
 For instance, they argue that backdating can be the result of social influences or a standard human resources 
process to successfully attract talent to the firm. Executives may also view the benefits from backdating as some 
type of personal entitlement. 
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management talent. Therefore, we expect a higher growth opportunity to increase 
the propensity for option backdating. 
 Profitability: return on assets is a ratio of EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) 
to total assets. Prior studies suggest that option repricing is associated with poor 
prior performance (Carter and Lynch, 2001; Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003). For 
retention purposes, we hypothesize that firms with poor prior performance tend to 
backdate options. 
 Industry: to capture the industry-specific effects, we follow Chidambaran and 
Prabhala (2003) and create three industry dummy variables.
6
 In addition, we use 
2-digit SIC codes to control for the industry fixed effects more generally. 
Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) find that firms in the technology, trade and 
service industries tend to reprice options. Carter and Lynch (2001) argue that 
high-technology firms are more likely to be situated in a competitive labour market 
and thus face higher managerial turnover. They show that option repricing is an 
effective tool to recruit and retain talent. Chance et al. (2000) and Brenner et al. 
(2000) do not find such discrepancies across industries. We hypothesize that, for 
retention purposes, executive stock options are more likely to be backdated in the 
high-technology industry. 
 Share Ownership: we estimate equity ownership as the ratio of shares owned by an 
executive to total shares outstanding of the firm. Equity ownership can be viewed as 
a measure for managerial entrenchment (Morck et al., 1988). For retention purposes, 
                                                 
6
 A technology industry dummy includes the Computer & Electronics Parts (group 8), Software & Technology 
(group 17), and Biotech (group 18) industries. A services industry dummy indicates the services industry (group 
15). A trade industry dummy contains the Wholesale (group 13) and Retail (group 14) industries. 
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we expect that executives with lower equity ownership (who are thus less 
entrenched) are more likely to have their options backdated. 
 
2.2.2. The Incentive Hypothesis 
Because stock options are generally granted at-the-money, the sensitivities of option values 
to stock price movements, and hence the managerial incentives, would vary over time. 
Deep-in-the-money options enhance managerial incentives because option values move 
nearly one-for-one with stock prices. In contrast, deep out-of-the-money options make 
option values insensitive to stock price fluctuations, resulting in weak incentives. Since 
these options are no longer able to render any material incentives, revising the strike price 
downward is necessary to restore managerial incentives. However, the very anticipation of 
option repricing can be detrimental to managerial incentives. By resetting the strike price, 
executives are in fact rewarded for poor performance, which contradicts the original 
purpose of option grants. This repricing possibility reduces managers' ex-ante incentives to 
perform because they are protected from downside risk. Acharya et al. (2000) employ an 
agency-theoretic model of compensation contracting and examine the incentive effects of 
option repricing. They show that although the anticipation of resetting can negatively affect 
initial incentives, resetting can still be important and enhance value for compensation 
contracts, even ex-ante. Repricing is almost always optimal in some contingencies. The 
equilibrium hinges on the tradeoff between these two opposing incentive effects. 
Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) find that higher executive option holdings (not share 
ownership) are associated with higher option repricing while Chen (2004) finds that higher 
CEO share ownership (not option holdings) decreases the likelihood of adopting repricing 
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restrictions. Ex-post, Sauer and Sautner (2008) find that performance improves significantly 
after repricing. 
Similar to the repricing literature, Gao and Mahmudi (2011) argue that backdating can 
be a form of efficient contracting for risk-averse and under-diversified executives. They 
find that backdating is associated with lower overall pay and better managerial incentive 
structures. Formally, our Incentive Hypothesis is described as follows: 
H2: Firms backdate options in order to create better incentives for their executives. 
We use the following proxies to test the Incentive Hypothesis: 
 Option Holdings: the option grant ratio is calculated by using option grant value 
(using the Black-Scholes method) divided by total compensation in the current 
year.
7
 As described before, equity-based compensation is designed to address the 
conflict of interest between ownership and control by aligning the interests of both 
parties (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When executives have large option holdings 
relative to their direct equity ownership, the need for option repricing is higher 
because of the misalignment in incentives when facing downside risk and/or simply 
because it is valuable to do so (Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003). Therefore, we 
hypothesize that executive option holdings are positively related to backdating. 
 Out-of-Moneyness: the literature on option repricing (e.g., Carter and Lynch, 2001; 
Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003) suggests that option repricing is positively 
associated with the out-of-moneyness (OOM) of existing executive option 
                                                 
7
 These values are reported by ExecuComp. As a proxy for option grant value, we use the data item 
“OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE” which adopts a modified Black-Scholes option valuation methodology. 
The modification is based on the fact that employee stock options are usually exercised early. For this reason 
they use 70% of the option’s stated life in the Black-Scholes calculation instead of the stated life of the option. 
See Veld (2003) for a discussion on the effects of early exercise on employee stock options.   
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portfolios for the purpose of restoring weak incentives. Instead of applying the 
full-information method (FI), the typical method in the repricing literature,
8
 which 
might require up to 10 years of historical proxy statements to perfectly identify the 
required characteristics of CEO option portfolios for Black and Scholes valuations, 
we follow Core and Guay's (2002) one-year approximation method (OA) which 
requires information from the most recent proxy statement only. They argue that the 
OA method explains 99% of the actual variation in option portfolio values and 
sensitivities. This has been widely adopted by studies that examine managerial 
option portfolio sensitivities (e.g., Brockman et al., 2010).
9
 
More specifically, we measure how the subsequent price change affects the 
in-the-money option value at the previous fiscal year-end (FYE). It is defined as follows, 
                (   )  
 ∑   ( 
      )
              
 
 
where ∑Qi is the aggregate number of unexercised (vested and unvested) options,  
OptionValueFYE  is the estimated value of unexercised (vested and unvested) in-the-money 
options at the previous FYE, P  is the stock price in the month prior to the option grant 
date, and PFYE  is the stock price at the previous FYE. Note that this measure potentially 
over-estimates the true value. We winsorize this variable at the 10% level for regression 
analysis, which helps address this issue in extreme cases. For incentive-realignment 
purposes, we conjecture a positive relation between OOM and option backdating. 
                                                 
8
 Tracking the history of entire option portfolio to construct OOM measure is possible in some previous 
repricing studies because the sample size is usually relatively small. For instance, Carter and Lynch (2001) 
study 263 repricing firms in 1998. Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) examine 213 repricing events between 
1992 and 1997 while Brenner et al. (2000) analyze 133 repricings between 1992 and 1995. 
9
 Chen (2004) follows Core and Guay (1999) and uses the average imputed moneyness of managers' stock 
option portfolios to study option repricing of 108 firms from 1994 to 1998. 
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2.2.3. The Agency Hypothesis 
In recent years there have been a number of cases where option repricing and backdating 
were linked to managerial self-dealing, which manifests itself in weak governance. For 
example, in 2006 William McGuire, the head of UnitedHealth Group, one of the largest US 
health insurers, was suspected of backdating options. An investigation by law firm Wilmer 
Cutler Pickering Hale found that: “Mr. McGuire was central to the options granting process 
and that the “full extent and nature” of financial relationships between him and the 
then-chairman of the company’s compensation committee that had created a conflict of 
interest in 1999 “likely were not disclosed” to the board at the time”.10 
The empirical evidence on the relation between internal governance and option 
repricing is mixed. Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) find that smaller boards, which are 
generally viewed as providing better governance, are more likely to reprice. Greater insider 
presence on the board (or its compensation committee) increases the likelihood of repricing 
(Brenner et al., 2000; Chance et al., 2000). However, Carter and Lynch (2001) find no 
relation between the board structure and option repricing. The evidence for option 
backdating is also mixed in the sense that Collins et al. (2009) find that option backdating 
results from weak governance, whereas Bizjak et al. (2009) do not find such a relation. A 
potential explanation for these different findings is that these studies measure governance 
differently: Collins et al. (2009) focus on variables regarding board independence while 
Bizjak et al. (2009) study board interlocks and consider board effectiveness.  
In order to shed more light on the relation between governance and backdating, we test 
the Agency Hypothesis using a variety of governance variables that capture different 
aspects of corporate governance. These include variables on board independence as Collins 
                                                 
10
 See “Uncertainty hangs over UnitedHealth”, Financial Times, October 16, 2006. 
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et al. (2009), on board effectiveness as Bizjak et al. (2009), and on minority shareholder 
protection as Gao and Mahmudi (2011). Formally, our Agency Hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
H3: Firms backdate options for reasons of managerial self-dealing.  
The following proxies measure board independence based on Collins et al. (2009). In 
all cases, a positive relation is hypothesized: 
 Inside Director: percentage of inside directors on the board. 
 Gray Director: percentage of gray outside directors on the board. An outside 
director is “gray” if (s)he is a former employee; is an employee of a significant 
service provider, supplier, or customer; is a recipient of charitable funds; is an 
interlocking director; or is a family member of an executive director. 
 CEO Hire Director: percentage of outside directors who are appointed after the 
incumbent CEO took office. 
 CEO Chair: a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chair of the 
board, and zero otherwise. 
 Inside Director Compensation: a dummy variable that equals one if at least one 
inside director serves on the compensation committee, and zero otherwise. 
In addition, similar to Bizjak et al. (2009), we use the following proxies: 
 Board Size: as one additional board characteristic, board size is the number of 
directors on the board. Yermack (1996) finds that smaller boards are associated with 
higher firm value, suggesting that smaller boards are more effective. 
 CEO Tenure: we use the difference between the first year of company involvement 
(based on records from Compustat, RiskMetrics, and other online sources) and the 
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option grant year as a proxy for CEO tenure. CEOs with long tenure are more likely 
to be entrenched or to influence the board to pursue rent-seeking activities. So, 
longer CEO tenure can lead to weaker internal governance, although this relation is 
not supported by empirical evidence. For instance, Chidambaran and Prabhala 
(2003) show that CEO tenure is not statistically significantly different between 
repricers and control firms or between repricers and the universe of non-repricers. 
 CEO Age: in order to be able to compare our results with previous studies we also 
use CEO age. 
The following two proxies measure the degree of protection of minority shareholders: 
 GIM Index: the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index, from now on the GIM 
index, is constructed using the incidence of 24 governance rules in relation to 
anti-takeover provisions that proxy for the level of shareholder rights. A firm with a 
higher GIM index is viewed as having inferior governance. 
 Entrenchment Index: this index follows Bebchuk et al. (2009) is based on six 
anti-takeover provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, 
poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and 
charter amendments. Like the GIM index, a firm with a higher index is associated 
with a lower degree of minority shareholder protection and thus weak governance. 
In short, if the managerial rent-seeking hypothesis (agency problems) holds, we expect 
the likelihood of option backdating to be higher for a firm with a high governance index, a 
large board with less board independence, and longer executive tenure (old age). 
 
2.2.4. Control variables 
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In order to correct for influential factors found in previous studies, we include the following 
control variables in our analysis: 
 Stock Volatility: stock volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock prices in the 
month of option grants. Stock volatility is a prerequisite for option backdating 
because higher volatility gives more leeway for choosing a favourable price to make 
adjustments. Without volatile stock price movements, the scope for option 
backdating is further reduced. High stock price volatility also indicates greater 
uncertainty for a typical risk-averse manager. Besides, as argued by Chen (2004), 
volatile stock price movements make option grants become more likely 
out-of-the-money. This gives rise to backdating for reincentivization. Therefore, 
consistent with Bizjak et al. (2009), we expect that stock price volatility is 
positively associated with option backdating. 
 Dispensable Cash: we estimate dispensable cash by using cash minus interest 
expenses, scaled by total assets. One alternative for option backdating is to pay cash 
while leaving the existing options intact. Moreover, the liquidity constraint might 
lead to option backdating to implement certain compensation practices (Fang, 2010). 
As a result, we expect a negative relation between a firm's dispensable cash 
holdings and the likelihood of option backdating. 
Other than the features described above, we expect that scheduled grants significantly 
reduce the likelihood of option backdating. Following Heron and Lie (2009), a grant is 
defined as scheduled if it occurs within one day of the one-year anniversary of a prior grant 
or is followed by a grant dated within one day of the one-year anniversary of the grant in 
question. Moreover, during the sample period, two major events occur that profoundly 
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change the behaviour of firms and investors: the passage of the SOX in 2002 and the media 
attention to the issue of option backdating beginning in late 2005. Several recent studies 
show that the SOX has effectively deterred firms from engaging in option backdating after 
2002 (e.g., Heron and Lie, 2007, 2009; Narayanan and Seyhun, 2008). However, Huang 
and Lu (2010) find that although the SOX mitigates option backdating, it is not until the 
media attention to scandals and the subsequent compensation disclosure rules implemented 
in 2006 that such opportunistic timing behaviour becomes obsolete. We use two dummy 
variables to capture the effects of the two events, and we expect that both decrease the 
likelihood of option backdating. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample 
We obtain our sample of CEO stock option grants from the Thomson Financial Insider 
Filing database, which provides all insider transactions reported on SEC forms 3, 4, 5, and 
144 in the U.S. We include transactions with the following derivative titles: OPTNS, 
EMPO, ISO, NONQ, CALL, WT, DIRO, RGHTS, and SAR. All of the sample transactions 
have a cleanse indicator of R ("data verified through the cleansing process"), H ("cleansed 
with a very high level of confidence"), or C ("a record added to nonderivative table or 
derivative table in order to correspond with a record on the opposing table"). We restrict 
our sample option grants to transactions that are granted or awarded to CEOs between 1999 
and 2007.
11
 We require stock returns to be available from 20 trading days before to 20 
trading days after the grant date. We further eliminate duplicate grants occurring on a given 
                                                 
11
 We include options granted until November 2007 because a month of subsequent stock returns is needed for 
estimation. We do not extend the sample period further to avoid the influences from the recent financial crisis. 
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grant date so that there is only one grant for a given date and company combination, i.e., 
firm-grant-date observation. 
This selection procedure leaves 26,092 firm-grant-date observations for 5,398 
companies. Next, we match these transactions with available corporate governance data 
from the RiskMetrics Governance, accounting and executive compensation data from the 
Compustat, and stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
12
 
In the end our final sample consists of 6,830 CEO option grants across 1,303 S&P1500 
companies in the U.S. during the period of 1999 to 2007. 
 
3.2. Methodology for Estimating the Likelihood of Backdating Grants 
Intuitively, absent opportunistic timing of grants or of information flows around grants, 
stock returns before and after grant dates should display similar patterns. Specifically, the 
distribution of the difference between the returns for a given number of days before and 
after the grants should be centered around zero. Similar to Heron and Lie (2007, 2009), we 
use this reasoning to estimate the likelihood of grants’ having been backdated.13 
Following Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2007), for the sample CEO option grants, we 
adopt the event study approach and estimate the cumulative abnormal returns as the 
                                                 
12
 The RiskMetrics Governance database publishes detailed listings of up to 30 corporate governance 
provisions for firms in corporate takeover defenses for more than 4,000 firms since 1990. The Compustat 
database provides annual and quarterly income statements, balance sheets, statements of cash flow, and 
supplemental data items on publicly held companies. Moreover, it provides summary compensation data in the 
Compustat ExecuComp. The CRSP database maintains a comprehensive collection of security price, return, 
and volume data for the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock markets, among others. 
13 Estimated abnormal stock price movement around grant dates might result from various manipulative 
practices, such as option backdating (Heron and Lie, 2007), option springloading (Yermack, 1997), and option 
repricing (Callaghan et al., 2004). Heron and Lie (2007) nevertheless argue that the majority of abnormal 
returns around declared grant dates suggest option backdating. In addition, abnormal stock price patterns should 
vary depending on the purposes of these manipulative practices. More specifically, for option springloading, 
abnormal stock returns before grant dates should not be significantly different from zero. Other than that, the 
abnormal stock returns around the grant dates should have a "V" shape for option backdating. 
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difference between the stock returns of the granting firm and the returns predicted by the 
Fama and French three-factor model. The estimation window lasts for 255 days, ending 46 
days before the grant date. The event window comprises 41 days in total, starting from 20 
trading days before and ending 20 trading days after the event. We choose the interval of 20 
trading days because previous studies (e.g., Heron and Lie, 2009) suggest that most of the 
abnormal returns around grants occur during the month immediately before and after the 
grants. We use the abnormal return difference before and after the grants as our estimate of 
the likelihood of option backdating.
14
 
We classify option grants as backdated when their abnormal return differences, i.e., 
AR(+1,+20)-AR(-20,-2), rank in the highest decile of the whole sample distribution, given 
that their AR(-20,-2) values are negative and AR(+1,+20) values are positive. In our sample, 
the lower bound of the highest decile is 17.16%.
15
 Heron and Lie (2009) estimate that, on 
average, 18.9% of all top executive option grants are manipulated, with 23% before and 10% 
after the 2002 SOX takes effect. At the firm level, 34.15% of our sample firms are 
estimated to have their CEO stock option grants backdated at some point during the period 
from 1999 to 2007,
16
 compared with 29.2% between 1996 and 2005, as reported by Heron 
and Lie (2009). Alternatively, of the 5,451 firm years in our sample, approximately 10.29% 
are classified as backdaters, compared to 14% in Bizjak et al. (2009) and 12.3% in Collins 
et al. (2009). Therefore, our choice of the top 10% as a threshold provides a conservative 
                                                 
14
 In our sample, the correlation between the difference in abnormal returns (the likelihood of backdating) and 
that in normal returns (the profitability of backdating)) is 0.7386. We run separate tests with the dummy 
variable based on the difference in normal returns as the proxy for backdating. The results are similar.  
15
 It is 24.78% (43.86%) when using the top 5% (1%) threshold. 
16
 When applying the top 5% threshold as an alternative proxy for option backdating, the percentage of 
manipulated firms drops to 18.96%, which provides a more conservative estimate. 
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estimate of option backdating while reducing potential noise in the data.
17
  
Note that as of September 4
th
, 2007, the Wall Street Journal reported 141 companies 
associated with past option backdating practices. Among these companies, 96 companies 
were subject to some punitive actions for various reasons by the SEC or the Justice 
Department. Among these companies, 57 are in our sample in which 26 companies are 
identified to have backdated options during the sample period. So, we believe that our 
method of estimating backdaters is valid, in spite of being conservative, and that our 
backdating sample does capture a significant proportion of true backdaters. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Determinants of Option Backdating 
4.1.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics.  
[Please Insert Table 1 here] 
In Panel A, the market value of slightly more than half of the firms is less than 2 billion 
U.S. dollars. In terms of industrial classification, as shown in Panel B, the computers and 
electronic parts industry has the most options that are potentially being backdated 
(20.35%),
18
 followed by the manufacturing industry (21.23%) and the services industry 
                                                 
17
 Heron and Lie (2009) estimate the likelihood by using the absolute return difference and a dummy indicating 
whether this difference is positive. Collins el al. (2009) classify a grant as backdated if the stock price at the 
grant date ranks in the lowest decile of the firm's stock price distribution over a 240-day window around the 
option grant date. Bizjak et al. (2009) first sort firms based on the stock volatility and then identify grants as 
being backdated by the magnitude of the post- to pre-grant return difference that corresponds to a pre-specified 
confidence level (e.g., 95% or 99%). 
18
 The percentage increases to 33.16% when using a broader definition of the high-technology industry 
(computers & electronic parts and software & technology, and biotech industry), as in Chidambaran and 
Prabhala (2003). 
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(8.77%). In terms of the timing of the option grants, Panel C shows that, until 2006, the 
issuance of option grants increases steadily over time. Moreover, consistent with previous 
studies, the estimated number of backdated options is higher in general before 2005. 
Particularly, between 1999 and 2002, approximately 12%-17% of option grants are 
estimated to have been backdated, similar to the findings in Heron and Lie (2009). 
Panel D displays the grant type distribution according to two categories, i.e., 
in-the-money, at-the-money, and out-of-the-money versus scheduled and unscheduled 
option grants, across three groups (whole sample, non-backdated, and backdated grants). In 
general, the grant type distribution of non-backdated options is similar to that of total 
options. In other words, our backdating sample is different from the non-backdating sample 
and the whole sample as well. We also find that unscheduled and out-of-the-money options 
are more subject to backdating. 
 
4.1.2. Univariate Comparisons 
Table 2 shows between-sample (non-backdated grants vs. backdated grants) comparisons of 
selected firm- and CEO-specific attributes, as well as internal governance.  
[Please Insert Table 2 here] 
Overall, most of the variables show discrepancies between non-backdated and 
backdated option grants at the 5% level of statistical significance for both mean and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. A firm with a higher propensity for backdating its CEO's option 
grants is typically smaller and younger. These results for Firm Size and Firm Age are in line 
with H1, the Retention Hypothesis. In line with the same hypothesis, backdating firms also 
have higher Growth Opportunity and a lower Profitability. The result on Share Ownership 
22 
 
goes against this hypothesis: we expected managers of backdating firms to have lower 
Share Ownership, but they have significantly higher Share Ownership instead. 
Consistent with H2, the Incentive Hypothesis, we find that backdated options are 
offered to executives with higher Option Holdings. Generally speaking, the means and 
medians of Out-of-Moneyness (OOM) are similar in backdated and non-backdate options, a 
result that seemingly goes against this hypothesis. Yet, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test result 
shows that there is a statistically significant difference between the underlying distributions 
of these two groups of options (P-value = 0). Specifically, backdated options have higher 
rank than non-backdated options. This provides evidence that backdated options are granted 
to CEOs whose option portfolios are associated with a higher degree of OOM. 
The first part of the Agency Hypothesis tests whether directors use their influence to 
backdate options. We find that for almost all variables there is no significant difference 
between backdating and non-backdating firms. The notable exception is the Inside Director 
variable that measures the percentage of inside directors on the board. In line with our 
expectations, we find that backdating firms have more inside directors than non-backdating 
firms. This result also confirms the univariate result of Collins et al. (2009), who also finds 
that backdating firms have a significantly higher percentage of inside directors than 
non-backdating firms. The finding that backdating firms have a smaller Board Size goes 
against this hypothesis, since smaller boards are expected to be more efficient. This result is 
in line with Bizjak et al. (2009). CEO Tenure is significantly shorter and CEO Age is 
significantly lower for backdaters, both providing evidence against H3. The result on CEO 
Age is in line with Bizjak et al. (2009).   
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The second part of the Agency Hypothesis tests whether backdating firms are more 
likely to expropriate minority shareholders than non-backdating firms. The surprising result 
is that the opposite seems to be the case: both the GIM Index and the Entrenchment Index 
are lower for backdating firms compared to non-backdating firms. This finding goes against 
our H3, but consistent with Gao and Mahmudi (2011). Finally, our results on control 
variables show that backdating firms have higher Stock Volatility, consistent with Bizjak et 
al. (2009), and a higher Dispensable Cash Ratio, which is contrary to our conjecture. 
 
4.1.3. Multivariate Analysis 
In this section, we use the following probit model to examine the relations between 
explanatory variables and the propensity for option backdating, 
Prob(Backdateit) = α0+β1*Firm Sizeit-1+β2*Firm Ageit+β3*Growth Opportunityit-1 
+β4*Profitabilityit-1+β5*Share Ownershipit+β6*Option Holdingsit +β7*Out-of-Moneynessit 
+β8*Governance proxiesit+β9*Stock Volatilityit+β10*Dispensable Cashit-1 +β11*Scheduledit 
+εit 
The dependent variable Backdate is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firm-grant-date 
observations whose abnormal stock return differences rank above the top 10% of the entire 
sample, under the condition that AR(-20,-2) is negative and AR(+1,+20) is positive, and 
zero otherwise. Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients (marginal effects and standardized 
coefficients alike) from seven probit models that link option backdating propensity to a 
number of explanatory variables, testing for the retention, incentive, and agency hypotheses 
described in Section 2.2. Standard deviations are clustered at the 2-digit SIC level in all 
model specifications. 
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[Please Insert Table 3 here] 
To test the three motives for backdating, Models 1 to 5 include the same set of 
explanatory variables for the retention and incentive hypothesis but use different measures 
for internal governance. The coefficients for Growth Opportunity and Share Ownership are 
positive, but are not significant in any of the five models. Nevertheless, the significantly 
negative coefficients for Firm size, Firm Age, and Profitability in all five models give a 
clear support for H1, the retention hypothesis in the sense that smaller and younger firms 
tend to backdate their CEO option grant dates more. Additionally, when a firm encounters a 
decline in accounting performance in the previous year, the likelihood of options' being 
backdated is higher. Finally in line with the retention hypothesis, we find that firms in the 
technology industry have a higher backdating propensity.  
The coefficient for Option Holdings is positive and is significant in three of these five 
models. The coefficient for Out-of-Moneyness is also positive and is significant at the 1% 
level in all five models. These results mean that option holdings have a positive relation 
with option backdating and that options tend to be backdated when a CEO's option 
portfolio becomes more out-of-the-money. Both results provide evidence for the incentive 
hypothesis (H2). 
We find little support for the hypothesis that stock option backdating is associated with 
less board independence. Only one of the governance variables in Model 1 is significant, 
i.e., a significantly negative relation exists between backdating and CEO Tenure. This 
result confirms the univariate analysis but goes against H3. In Model 2 we find a 
significantly negative relation at the 1% level between backdating and Board Size. This 
result also goes against H3, because small boards are expected to be more effective. In 
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Models 3 and 4 respectively, we find significantly negative relations between option 
backdating and the GIM Index and the Entrenchment Index. These results are contrary to 
H3. In Model 5, we follow Model 2 and replace CEO Tenure by CEO Age,
19
 whose 
coefficient is negative but not statistically significant. 
In Model 6, as one supplemental test, we use different control variables in combination 
with the governance variables, comparable with Collins et al. (2009). In that model, we find 
a positive relation between the number of Inside Directors and backdating. This result 
provides the only minor evidence in favour of H3. Finally, we find that options granted 
since the 2002 SOX are less likely to be backdated and that higher stock volatility is 
associated with more backdating.  
These results still hold after controlling for industry and year fixed effects, as shown in 
Model 7.
20
 The marginal-effects estimates suggest that a drop of 10 million dollars in firm 
size increases the backdating likelihood by 2.8%. When a firm is one year younger, its 
propensity to backdate increases by 0.1%. A 100% decline in profitability increases such 
likelihood by 8.9%. Despite somewhat lower statistical significance (at 5% level), in terms 
of economic significance Profitability plays the most prominent role in the decision to 
backdate. On the other hand, when the Out-of-Moneyness of the CEO option portfolio 
increases by $1, the backdating likelihood increases by 1.8%. When there is one fewer 
director on the board, the likelihood of backdating goes up by 0.2%. Note that this 
likelihood increases by 1.3% when the standard deviation of stock price during the grant 
month increases by 100%. 
                                                 
19
 The correlation between these two variables is 0.3438 (statistically significant at the 1% level). 
20
 We use Board Size as the proxy for governance because it gives highest explanatory power (9.47% in Model 
2) compared with models using alternative proxies. The explanatory power increases to 11.57% in Model 7. 
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Moreover, the standardized coefficients in Table 3 indicate that, robust to all model 
specifications, the main driver is firm size (the retention hypothesis), followed by OOM 
(the incentive hypothesis), stock volatility, and firm age (the retention hypothesis). In sum, 
results suggest that option backdating is more for retention considerations and, to a lesser 
extent, for reincentivization. This result is consistent with the option repricing literature. 
Most of our results show that option backdating is not related to weaker governance or 
managerial entrenchment. Indeed, for the GIM Index and the Entrenchment Index results 
indicate that backdating is associated with superior governance and less entrenchment. This 
finding is in contrast with the typical managerial power view. 
 
4.2. Option Backdating and Subsequent Performance 
After exploring the determinants of backdating, naturally the next question that we ask is 
concerning its consequences. Other than the legal ramifications, we are more interested in 
one real consequence: whether backdating is detrimental to firm value ex post, as the 
agency hypothesis indicates. To that end, we investigate the relation, if any, between option 
backdating and subsequent firm performance, in terms of both accounting and market 
measures. This can help us to further test the incentive hypothesis by examining the 
effectiveness of reincentivization. 
 
4.2.1. Accounting Performance 
The analysis in Section 4.1.3 shows that the decision to reset option grant dates is very 
likely not random. This is an example of sample selection. As such, rather than the simple 
linear models commonly adopted in the option backdating literature, treatment effect 
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models are more appropriate than conventional Heckman sample selection models.
21
 We 
view the decision to backdate option grants, a binary variable, as a treatment to 
re-incentivize managers, as the incentive hypothesis suggests. Ideally we should examine 
whether performance is better than it would have been in the absence of such behaviour.
22
 
Since the latter cannot be observed, we use the performance of non-backdating firms (the 
untreated) as a proxy (i.e., assuming that the outcomes of the untreated are independent of 
treatment after controlling for a set of independent variables) and in the meantime control 
for firms' choices to backdate.
23
  
In this section, we use forward return on assets as a proxy for post-backdating 
operating performance to incorporate subsequent firm performance into our previous 
multivariate analysis. More specifically, we use the treatment-effects model (Greene, 2012) 
that estimates the effect of an endogenous binary treatment, Backdateit , on a continuous, 
fully observed variable Profitabilityit+1 , conditional on two sets of explanatory variables 
for each dependent variable. Formally, the primary interest is the following model 
specification: 
Profitabilityit+1 = α0+β1*Firm Sizeit+β2*Profitabilityit+β3*Backdateit+εit 
where Backdateit is an endogenous dummy variable indicating whether the treatment is 
assigned or not. The binary decision to obtain the treatment Backdateit is modelled as the 
outcome of an unobserved latent variable, Backdate*it, which is assumed to be a linear 
                                                 
21
 In a treatment effect model, (1) a dummy variable indicating the treatment condition is directly entered into 
the regression equation and (2) the outcome of the regression equation is always observed regardless of the 
treatment condition (Fraser and Guo, 2009). 
22
 Here we choose to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) instead of the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE) that requires a stronger conditional independence assumption. This assumption refers 
to the condition that the outcomes are independent of treatment, conditional on a set of explanatory variables. 
23
 This gives us a consistent estimate of the ATET mentioned in footnote 22. See Greene (2012) for detailed 
discussion. 
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function of the exogenous covariates and a random component. In our study, the binary 
Backdate*it variable is a function of a set of selection variables shown in Section 4.1.3. 
The decision to obtain the treatment, i.e., to have existing option grants backdated, is a 
binary variable and made according to the rule, 
           {
               
   
           
 
where Backdate*it = f(Firm Sizeit-1, Firm Ageit, Growth Opportunityit-1, Profitabilityit-1, 
Share Ownershipit, Option Holdingsit, Out-of-Moneynessit, Governance proxiesit,  Stock 
Volatilityit, Dispensable Cashit-1, Scheduledit). 
Table 4 reports maximum likelihood estimates.  
[Please Insert Table 4 here] 
Similar to the model specifications in the previous multivariate tests, Models 1 to 5 are 
identical except for adopting different proxies for internal governance. On average, after 
controlling for contemporaneous Firm Size and Profitability (together with industry and 
year fixed effects), the act of backdating CEO option grants is not related to subsequent 
operating performance. Compared to Table 3, we find that the same set of determinants of 
backdating seems able to explain backdating when using the treatment-effects model. 
Moreover, Growth Opportunity and Option Holdings become statistically significant. It 
thus suggests that, when taking into account subsequent firm performance and viewing 
option backdating as a treatment instead of a random or dummy variable, fast growing 
firms and CEOs holding more option grants also increase the likelihood of backdating.
24
 
                                                 
24
 The results are qualitatively the same when we employ the two-stage least squares estimation (results not 
tabulated and available upon request). 
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These results give further evidence that the rationale behind backdating is more for 
retention and less for incentive realignment, resembling the mechanism of option repricing. 
Again, we do not find evidence of inferior corporate governance and/or higher management 
entrenchment in the selection process.  
 
4.2.2. Market Performance 
Other than short-term performance, it is also important to investigate whether option 
backdating has any consequences for a firm's long-term performance. In this section, we 
employ the calendar-time Fama-French four-factor model to estimate abnormal returns. We 
follow standard procedures in the literature with two approaches. For the grant-based 
approach, each month we form portfolios consisting of all option grants that are issued 
within the last n years (where n is the length of the holding period).
25
 For the firm-based 
approach, the monthly portfolios contain all firms that issue an option grant within the last 
n years.
26
 The portfolios are rebalanced monthly, with those that reach the end of the 
holding period dropping out and new ones coming in. If a firm is delisted before the end of 
the holding period, we include its delisting return in computing the portfolio return. Then, 
we calculate the portfolio i mean monthly abnormal return (αi) by regressing its excess 
return on the four Fama-French factors: 
      
        (  
      
 )                              
where Ri  is the equal-weighted portfolio i return, R
f  is the risk-free rate (one month 
                                                 
25
 This n-year window represents (n*12)-1 months. Unlike n*12 months commonly used in the literature, we do 
not include the first month after the event to avoid overestimation for the sample group due to its higher return 
in the post-grant period. 
26
 Similar to Collins et al. (2009), the backdating firm-months consist of firm-months that have at least one 
backdated CEO stock option grant. The non-backdating firm-months consist of firm-months that have all 
non-backdated CEO stock option awards. 
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Treasury bill rate), Rmar  is the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return, SMB is the 
return of a portfolio of small stocks minus the return of a portfolio of large stocks, HML  is 
the return of a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return of a portfolio of 
low book-to-market stocks, and WML  is the return of a portfolio of high momentum 
stocks (winner) minus the return of a portfolio of low momentum stocks (loser). We 
exclude portfolios consisting of less than 4 companies and the corresponding portfolios of 
their pairs, if anything. 
Table 5 shows the (mean) abnormal returns for both types of portfolios consisting of 
backdated and non-backdated options in terms of the grant- and the firm-based approaches.  
[Please Insert Table 5 here] 
Overall, the mean abnormal return for the backdated option portfolio is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level only in the 2-year horizon. Nevertheless, when 
compared with the non-backdated option portfolio, the abnormal return difference is never 
statistically significant. As a result, option backdating seems unable to provide incentives 
that lead to outperformance in the long run (no evidence for underperformance either). To 
summarize, the findings in Section 4.2. suggest that option backdating in general does not 
serve the incentive-realignment purposes, regardless of the time horizon. Therefore, option 
backdating is arguably to retain valuable employees more than to reincentivize them, which 
is consistent with option repricing.
27
 
                                                 
27
 We conduct a series of robustness checks using alternative methods of classification and/or sample 
constructions, i.e., filed-late (and unscheduled) options granted in the post-SOX period following Heron and 
Lie (2007); the top 10% threshold for at-the-money and unscheduled grants similar to Heron and Lie (2007, 
2009); the bottom 10% threshold over a 240-day window for unscheduled grants similar to Collins et al. (2009). 
As a whole, consistent with the main results, we do not find relations between backdating and subsequent firm 
performance. Similarly, different hypotheses show varying degrees of strength in each alternative model 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The practice of employee option backdating is not without controversy. For example, the 
widely used textbook of Hull (2012) on derivative securities argues (page 341): “No 
discussion of employee stock options would be complete without mentioning backdating 
scandals.” In this paper we study the motives for employee stock option backdating. Our 
somewhat surprising overall finding is that agency problems hardly seem to play a role in 
the motives for CEO option backdating. We find very limited evidence for managerial 
self-dealing. There is some evidence that backdating firms have more inside directors on 
the board. However, even the evidence for that result is not completely conclusive. In fact, 
we find evidence contrary to the agency hypothesis, i.e., backdating firms have better 
protection of minority shareholders than firms that do not backdate. Our study provides an 
interesting link between the findings of Collins et al. (2009) and Bizjak et al. (2009). 
Motives that do find more support in our analysis are employee retention and 
incentivisation of employees. In general, our results show that the main driver of option 
backdating is firm size, followed by executive option portfolios being out-of-the-money, 
stock volatility, and firm age. To our best knowledge, this paper is the first study that 
considers option out-of-moneyness in this line of literature. In sum, our findings indicate 
that option backdating is seemingly beyond agency problems. Given the sticky governance 
structure, the systemic use of option backdating across companies and the intermittent 
pattern within a company documented by Heron and Lie (2009) cannot be merely explained 
by (inferior) governance.  
                                                                                                                                                    
specification, with limited evidence supporting the agency hypothesis. These supplemental test results are not 
tabulated and available upon request. 
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Table 1 
Sample Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics of sample firms/grants. Panel A displays the firm size distribution, in which 
the size is proxied by the (mean) market value of sample firms between 1999 and 2007. Panels B displays, grant-
wise, their industrial orientations, in which the industrial classification is based on SIC codes using the classification 
by Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003). A grant is assumed to be backdated when its value of AR(+1,+20)-AR(-20,-2) 
is ranked among the top 10% of all sample grants, under the condition that its AR(-20,-2) is negative and 
AR(+1,+20) is positive. Panel C reports the grant year distribution. Panel D shows the grant type distribution. A 
grant is defined as scheduled if it occurs within one day of the one-year anniversary of a prior grant or is followed 
by a grant dated within one day of the one-year anniversary of the grant in question. A grant is at-the-money (out-of-
the-money/in-the-money) if its exercise price is equal to (larger/lower than) the close price on the grant date.  
 
Panel A: Size (firm-wise) 
Market Value 
(US$ million) Number of Firms Fraction (%) 
<500 189 14.50 
500 – 1,000 222 17.04 
1,000 – 2,000 267 20.49 
2,000 – 3,000 116 8.90 
3,000 – 4,000 91 6.98 
4,000 – 5,000 52 3.99 
5,000 – 6,000 51 3.91 
6,000 - 7,000 28 2.15 
7,000 – 8,000 25 1.92 
8,000 – 9,000 28 2.15 
9,000 – 10,000 19 1.46 
>10,000 215 16.50 
Sample Size 1,303 100.00 
 
 
Panel B: Industry (grant-wise) 
Industry Number of Total Grants 
Number of 
Non-Backdated 
Options 
Fraction (%) 
Number of 
Backdated 
Options 
Fraction (%) 
Agriculture & Food   191  183  2.93  8  1.40  
Mining   48  44  0.70  4  0.70  
Construction   83  72  1.15  11  1.93  
Oil & Petroleum  252  236  3.78  16  2.81  
Small Scale Manufacturing 327  302  4.83  25  4.39  
Chemicals/related manufacturing 893  822  13.16  71  12.46  
Industrial Manufacturing   619  569  9.11  50  8.77  
Computers & Electronic Parts   810  694  11.11  116  20.35  
Printing & Publishing   147  143  2.29  4  0.70  
Transportation   221  197  3.15  24  4.21  
Telecommunication   102  94  1.50  8  1.40  
Utilities   354  337  5.39  17  2.98  
Wholesale   210  191  3.06  19  3.33  
Retail  401  368  5.89  33  5.79  
Services  571  521  8.34  50  8.77  
Financials   884  843  13.49  41  7.19  
Software & Technology   422  371  5.94  51  8.95  
Biotech  283  261  4.18  22  3.86  
Sample Size 6,818  6,248  100.00  570  100.00  
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Panel C: Year (grant-wise) 
Year Number of  Total Grants 
Number of  
Non-Backdated 
Options 
Fraction (%) 
Number of  
Backdated 
Options 
Fraction (%) 
1999 500 441 7.05  59 10.30  
2000 550 470 7.51  80 13.96  
2001 687 579 9.25  108 18.85  
2002 727 640 10.23  87 15.18  
2003 908 839 13.41  69 12.04  
2004 917 857 13.70  60 10.47  
2005 949 911 14.56  38 6.63  
2006 836 795 12.71  41 7.16  
2007 756 725 11.59  31 5.41  
Sample Size 6,830 6,257 100.00  573 100.00  
 
 
Panel D: Grant Type 
  Total Option Grants  Non-Backdated Options  Backdated Options 
  In-the-
money 
At-the-
money 
Out-of-
the-
money 
Sub- 
total  
In-the-
money 
At-the-
money 
Out-of-
the-
money 
Sub- 
total  
In-the-
money 
At-the-
money 
Out-of-
the-
money 
Sub- 
total 
Unscheduled Number 1,270  2,077  1,055  4,402   1,153  1,881  953  3,987   117  196  102  415  
 Fraction (%) 18.60  30.41  15.45  64.46   18.43  30.07  15.23  63.73   20.42  34.21  17.80  72.43  
                
Scheduled Number 733  1,035  659  2,427   690  971  608  2,269   43  64  51  158  
 Fraction (%) 10.73  15.16  9.65  35.54   11.03  15.52  9.72  36.27   7.50  11.17  8.90  27.57  
                
Sub-total Number 2,003  3,112  1,714  6,829   1,843  2,852  1,561  6,256   160  260  153  573  
 Fraction (%) 29.33  45.57  25.10  100.00   29.46  45.59  24.95  100.00   27.92  45.38  26.70  100.00  
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Table 2 
Comparisons of Selected Characteristics of (Non-)Backdated CEO Option Grants 
This table presents means and medians of selected characteristics of CEO stock option grants between 1999 and 
2007. An option grant is assumed to be backdated when its value of AR(+1,+20)-AR(-20,-2) is ranked among the 
top 10% of all sample grants, under the condition that its AR(-20,-2) is negative and AR(+1,+20) is positive. Firm 
size is proxied by market value of equity. Firm age is the difference between the first year in which the firm has data 
in Compustat and the option grant year. Growth opportunity is the market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value 
of assets (the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of book value of common 
equity and balance sheet deferred taxes) divided by the book value of total assets. Profitability is measured by the 
return on assets, a ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) to total assets. Share ownership is calculated as 
shares owned over total shares outstanding. Option holdings is option grant value (Black-Scholes) divided by total 
compensation in the current year. Out-of-Moneyness is measured by the product of the aggregate number of 
(unexercised vested and unvested) option grants at the previous fiscal year end and the stock price difference 
between the previous fiscal year end and the month prior to the grant date, scaled by the (unexercised vested and 
unvested) in-the-money option value at the previous fiscal year end. Inside Director is the percentage of inside 
directors on the board. Gray Director is the percentage of gray outside directors on the board. CEO Hire Director is 
the percentage of outside board directors who are appointed after the incumbent CEO took office. CEO Chair is a 
dummy variable that is assigned to one if the CEO is also the chair of the board, and zero otherwise. Inside Director 
Compensation is a dummy variable that is assigned to one if at least one inside director serves on the compensation 
committee, and zero otherwise. Board size is the number of directors on the board. CEO tenure is the difference 
between the first year of company involvement and the option grant year. The GIM Index follows Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003), and the Entrenchment Index follows Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). Stock volatility is the 
standard deviation of daily stock prices in the option-granting month. Dispensable cash is defined as cash minus 
interest expenses, scaled by total assets. 
Variables 
Non-Backdated 
Options Backdated Options 
p-Value of 
Test  
for Diff. in 
Means 
(Distributions) 
Number of 
Observations Mean Median Mean Median 
Retention 
Hypothesis 
H1 Firm Size 12,656.24  2,982.08  8,048.66  1,769.37  0.0008 6,824 
     (0)  
Firm Age 28.68  24.00  23.06  16.00  0 6,830 
     (0)  
Growth Opportunity 1.95  1.53  2.19  1.67  0.0001 6,824 
     (0.0087)  
Profitability 0.09  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.0001 6,824 
     (0.0016)  
Share Ownership 
(%, excl. options) 
1.07  0.00  1.58  0.00  0.0016 6,701 
    (0)  
Incentive 
Hypothesis 
H2 Option Holdings (%) 0.36  0.36  0.47  0.50  0 6,701 
    (0)  
Out-of-Moneyness -77.92  0.00  19.36  0.00  0.2514 6,440 
     (0)  
Agency 
Hypothesis 
H3 Inside Director (%) 0.17  0.14  0.19  0.17  0 6,277 
     (0)  
Gray Director (%) 0.11  0.09  0.12  0.10  0.3961 6,277 
     (0.3376)  
CEO Hire Director 
(%) 0.46  0.43  0.48  0.44  0.1542 6,277 
     (0.2678)  
CEO Chair 0.63  1.00  0.59  1.00  0.1014 6,277 
     (0.1014)  
Inside Director  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.2077 6,277 
Compensation     (0.2077)  
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Board Size 9.91  10.00  8.86  9.00  0 6,277 
     (0)  
CEO Tenure 12.77  10.00  11.81  8.00  0.0425 6,758 
     (0.034)  
CEO Age 55.82  56.00  54.58  55.00  0.0001 6,542 
     (0.0001)  
 GIM Index 9.51  9.00  8.92  9.00  0 6,830 
     (0)  
Entrenchment Index 2.38  2.00  2.18  2.00  0.0003 6,830 
     (0.0004)  
Control Attributes Stock Volatility 1.29  0.88  1.64  1.12  0 6,807 
     (0)  
Dispensable Cash 0.07  0.04  0.09  0.05  0 6,824     (0.0001)  
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Table 3 
Determinants of Option Backdating 
This table provides coefficient estimates (marginal effects) for the probit models explaining the decision to backdate CEO stock option. The model specification is as 
follows, Prob(Backdateit)=α0+β1*Firm Sizeit-1+β2*Firm Ageit+β3*Growth Opportunityit-1+β4*Profitabilityit-1+β5*Share Ownershipit+β6*Option Holdingsit +β7*Out-
of-Moneynessit+β8*Governance proxiesit+β9*Stock Volatilityit+β10*Dispensable Cashit-1+β11*Scheduledit+εit. The dependent variable is assigned the value 1 for 
grants whose AR(+1,+20)-AR(-20,-2) is ranked among the top 10% of all sample grants, under the condition that AR(-20,-2) is negative and AR(+1,+20) is positive, 
and 0 otherwise. For the explanatory variables, firm size is proxied by log(1+market value of equity). Firm age is the difference between the first year in which the 
firm has data in Compustat and the option grant year. Growth opportunity is the market-to-book ratio (winsorized at the 1% level), defined as the market value of 
assets (the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of book value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes) divided by the 
book value of total assets. Profitability is measured by the return on assets, a ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) to total assets (winsorized at the 1% 
level). Share ownership is calculated as shares owned over total shares outstanding (winsorized at the 1% level). Option holdings is option grant value (Black-Scholes) 
divided by total compensation in the current year. Out-of-Moneyness is measured by the product of the aggregate number of (unexercised vested and unvested) option 
grants at the previous fiscal year end and the stock price difference between the previous fiscal year end and the month prior to the grant date, scaled by the 
(unexercised vested and unvested) in-the-money option value at the previous fiscal year end (winsorized at the 1% level). Inside Director is the percentage of inside 
directors on the board. Gray Director is the percentage of gray outside directors on the board. CEO Hire Director is the percentage of outside board directors who are 
appointed after the incumbent CEO took office. CEO Chair is a dummy variable that is assigned to one if the CEO is also the chair of the board, and zero otherwise. 
Inside Director Compensation is a dummy variable that is assigned to one if at least one inside director serves on the compensation committee, and zero otherwise. 
Board size is the number of directors on the board. CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of the difference between the first year of company involvement and the 
option grant year. CEO age is standardized by the natural logarithm. The GIM Index follows Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and the Entrenchment Index 
follows Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). Stock volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock prices in the option-granting month (winsorized at the 1% level). 
Dispensable cash is defined as cash minus interest expenses, scaled by total assets. A grant is defined as scheduled if it occurs within one day of the one-year 
anniversary of a prior grant or is followed by a grant dated within one day of the one-year anniversary of the grant in question. Industry fixed effects adopt 2-digit SIC 
codes. Standard deviations are clustered at the 2-digit SIC level. Fully standardized coefficients (both dependent and explanatory variables) are reported in brackets. 
Z-values are reported in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Predicted Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Retention  Firm Size (t-1) － -0.038*** -0.031*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.030*** -0.040*** -0.028*** 
Hypothesis   [-0.186] [-0.152] [-0.198] [-0.202] [-0.147] [-0.185] [-0.141] 
   (-4.99) (-3.92) (-5.81) (-6.11) (-3.8) (-5.36) (-3.59) 
 Firm Age (t) － -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001***   -0.001*** 
   [-0.094] [-0.091] [-0.072] [-0.08] [-0.09]   [-0.093] 
   (-3.02) (-3.05) (-2.31) (-2.66) (-3.09)   (-3.13) 
 Growth Opportunity (t-1) + 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003   0.004* 
   [0.039] [0.033] [0.042] [0.042] [0.031]   [0.041] 
   (1.57) (1.33) (1.53) (1.57) (1.08)  (1.81) 
 Profitability (t-1) － 
 
-0.101** -0.109*** -0.074* -0.073* -0.116***  -0.089** 
  [-0.061] [-0.066] [-0.047] [-0.046] [-0.07]  [-0.055] 
   (-2.3) (-2.61) (-1.73) (-1.71) (-2.66)  (-2.51) 
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 Technology (t) + 0.027** 0.023** 0.026* 0.026* 0.023* 0.042***  
   [0.074] [0.064] [0.073] [0.071] [0.063] [0.107]  
   (2.19) (2.05) (1.95) (1.95) (1.77) (4.28)  
 Services (t)  0.007 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005   
   [0.014] [0.01] [0.007] [0.007] [0.01]   
   (0.58) (0.43) (0.32) (0.33) (0.47)   
 Trade (t)  0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.003   
   [0.013] [0.012] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006]   
   (0.75) (0.67) (0.29) (0.23) (0.34)   
 Share Ownership (t) － 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
   [0.017] [0.017] [0.022] [0.021] [0.014] [0.033] [0.019] 
   (0.84) (0.91) (1.05) (1.03) (0.74) (1.64) (0.97) 
Incentive Option Holdings (t) + 
 
0.022* 0.019 0.022* 0.021* 0.022   0.009 
Hypothesis  [0.047] [0.04] [0.046] [0.045] [0.047]   [0.019] 
   (1.88) (1.5) (1.81) (1.77) (1.53)   (0.83) 
 Out-of-Moneyness (t) + 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018***  0.018*** 
   [0.13] [0.128] [0.121] [0.121] [0.122]  [0.132] 
   (5.49) (5.51) (5.28) (5.28) (5.12)  (5.75) 
Agency 
Hypothesis 
Inside Director (t) + 0.005     0.086**  
  [0.003]     [0.054]  
   (0.13)     (2.19)  
 Gray Director (t) + -0.006     0.029  
   [-0.006]     [0.025]  
   (-0.24)     (0.98)  
 CEO Hire Director (t) + 0.011     0.016  
   [0.025]     [0.035]  
   (1.13)     (1.47)  
 CEO Chair (t) + -0.000     0.002  
   [-0.001]     [0.007]  
   (-0.03)     (0.3)  
 Inside Director  + 0.008     0.010  
 Compensation (t)  [0.004]         [0.005]   
   (0.17)         (0.21)   
 Board Size (t) +  -0.003***   -0.003***  -0.002* 
    [-0.069]   [-0.066]  [-0.041] 
    (-3.36)   (-3.15)  (-1.68) 
 CEO Tenure (t) + -0.006* -0.004 -0.006* -0.006*  -0.011*** -0.003 
   [-0.039] [-0.027] [-0.037] [-0.039]  [-0.067] [-0.021] 
   (-1.82) (-1.21) (-1.69) (-1.81)  (-3.29) (-0.93) 
 CEO Age +     -0.013   
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       [-0.012]   
       (-0.52)   
 GIM Index (t) +   -0.002**     
     [-0.036]     
     (-2.36)     
 Entrenchment Index (t) +    -0.005*    
      [-0.042]    
      (-1.75)    
Control Stock Volatility (t) + 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.013*** 
Attributes   [0.133] [0.129] [0.122] [0.122] [0.128] [0.177] [0.114] 
   (5.66) (5.43) (5.41) (5.41) (5.4) (8.67) (4.77) 
 Dispensable Cash (t-1) － 0.001 -0.002 0.013 0.012 -0.005  0.005 
   [0.001] [-0.001] [0.01] [0.01] [-0.004]  [0.004] 
   (0.03) (-0.06) (0.55) (0.51) (-0.17)  (0.19) 
 Scheduled (t) － -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.013 -0.002 
   [-0.012] [-0.01] [-0.011] [-0.012] [-0.012] [-0.042] [-0.006] 
   (-0.44) (-0.41) (-0.4) (-0.42) (-0.47) (-1.59) (-0.23) 
 Post-SOX (t) － -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.056***   
   [-0.209] [-0.211] [-0.202] [-0.201] [-0.209]   
   (-7.06) (-7.59) (-7.33) (-7.09) (-7.67)   
 Post-Scandal (t) － -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051***   
   [-0.189] [-0.196] [-0.19] [-0.188] [-0.19]   
   (-5.71) (-5.7) (-5.28) (-5.23) (-5.05)   
          
Industry FE   No No No No No No Yes 
Year FE   No No No No No No Yes 
Pseudo R2   0.0935 0.0947 0.0878 0.0881 0.093 0.0499 0.1157 
# of obs.   5,900 5,900 6,360 6,360 5,786 6,131 5,799 
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Table 4 
Option Backdating and Subsequent Accounting Performance 
This table shows the maximum likelihood coefficient estimates of the treatment-effects models on how the 
backdating of CEO stock option grants might influence subsequent accounting performance. The model 
specification is as follows, Profitabilityit+1=α0+β1*Firm Sizeit+β2*Profitabilityit+β3*Backdateit+εit. The dependent 
variable is forward return on assets, a ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) to total assets in year (t+1). 
For the explanatory variables, the option backdating variable is a dummy variable and made according to the rule, 
𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = �1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡∗ > 00, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
where Backdate*it=f(Firm Sizeit-1, Firm Ageit, Growth Opportunityit-1, Profitabilityit-1, Share Ownershipit, Option 
Holdingsit, Out-of-Moneynessit, Governance proxiesit,  Stock Volatilityit, Dispensable Cashit-1, Scheduledit). Firm size is 
proxied by log(1+market value of equity). Firm age is the difference between the first year in which the firm has data in 
Compustat and the option grant year. Growth opportunity is the market-to-book ratio (winsorized at the 1% level), 
defined as the market value of assets (the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of 
book value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes) divided by the book value of total assets. Profitability is 
measured by the return on assets, a ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) to total assets (winsorized at the 1% 
level). Share ownership is calculated as shares owned over total shares outstanding (winsorized at the 1% level). Option 
holdings is option grant value (Black-Scholes) divided by total compensation in the current year. Out-of-Moneyness is 
measured by the product of the aggregate number of (unexercised vested and unvested) option grants at the previous 
fiscal year end and the stock price difference between the previous fiscal year end and the month prior to the grant date, 
scaled by the (unexercised vested and unvested) in-the-money option value at the previous fiscal year end (winsorized at 
the 10% level). Inside Director is the percentage of inside directors on the board. Gray Director is the percentage of gray 
outside directors on the board. CEO Hire Director is the percentage of outside board directors who are appointed after 
the incumbent CEO took office. CEO Chair is a dummy variable that is assigned to one if the CEO is also the chair of 
the board, and zero otherwise. Inside Director Compensation is a dummy variable that is assigned to one if at least one 
inside director serves on the compensation committee, and zero otherwise. Board size is the number of directors on the 
board. CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of the difference between the first year of company involvement and the 
option grant year. CEO age is standardized by the natural logarithm. The GIM Index follows Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003), and the Entrenchment Index follows Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). Stock volatility is the standard 
deviation of daily stock prices in the option-granting month (winsorized at the 1% level). Dispensable cash is defined as 
cash minus interest expenses, scaled by total assets. A grant is defined as scheduled if it occurs within one day of the 
one-year anniversary of a prior grant or is followed by a grant dated within one day of the one-year anniversary of the 
grant in question. All proxies for profitability are winsorized at the 1% level. Industry fixed effects adopt 2-digit SIC 
codes. Z-values are reported in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Control Variables:      
 Firm Size (t) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
  (8.19) (8.2) (8.76) (8.78) (8.46) 
 Profitability (t) 0.796*** 0.796*** 0.795*** 0.795*** 0.795*** 
  (95.03) (95.03) (101.2) (101.2) (94.21) 
Option  -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
Backdating  (-0.9) (-0.86) (-0.87) (-0.77) (-0.83) 
Selection Variables:      
Retention  Firm Size (t-1) -0.343*** -0.310*** -0.351*** -0.359*** -0.299*** 
Hypothesis  (-7.15) (-5.84) (-7.85) (-8) (-5.58) 
 Firm Age (t) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003* -0.004** -0.005** 
  (-2.65) (-2.63) (-1.78) (-2.18) (-2.5) 
 Growth Opportunity (t-1) 0.054** 0.048* 0.052** 0.051** 0.046* 
  (2.13) (1.87) (2.22) (2.19) (1.78) 
 Profitability (t-1) -0.860** -0.868** -0.682** -0.665** -0.930*** 
  (-2.5) (-2.53) (-2.18) (-2.13) (-2.69) 
 Share Ownership (t) 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.007 
  (0.86) (0.96) (1.28) (1.2) (0.97) 
 
 
43 
 
Incentive Option Holdings (t) 0.488*** 0.484*** 0.479*** 0.474*** 0.498*** 
Hypothesis  (5.34) (5.35) (5.55) (5.49) (5.45) 
 Out-of-Moneyness (t) 0.164*** 0.163*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.157*** 
  (5.92) (5.89) (5.94) (5.94) (5.61) 
Agency 
Hypothesis 
Inside Director (t) 0.232     
 (0.83)     
 Gray Director (t) 0.059     
  (0.3)     
 CEO Hire Director (t) 0.022     
  (0.25)     
 CEO Chair (t) -0.004     
  (-0.07)     
 Inside Director  0.144     
 Compensation (t) (0.5)     
 Board Size (t)  -0.020*   -0.020 
   (-1.66)   (-1.64) 
 CEO Tenure (t) -0.045 -0.034 -0.045 -0.048  
  (-1.36) (-1.11) (-1.53) (-1.64)  
 CEO Age     -0.218 
      (-1.09) 
 GIM Index (t)   -0.016*   
    (-1.65)   
 Entrenchment Index (t)    -0.044**  
     (-2.25)  
Control Stock Volatility (t) 0.165*** 0.163*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.162*** 
Attributes  (8.12) (8.02) (7.74) (7.68) (7.88) 
 Dispensable Cash (t-1) -0.287 -0.346 -0.140 -0.154 -0.377 
  (-1.07) (-1.29) (-0.58) (-0.64) (-1.37) 
 Scheduled (t) -0.050 -0.053 -0.050 -0.051 -0.051 
  (-0.92) (-0.98) (-0.95) (-0.97) (-0.94) 
       
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2  15352.59 15353.52 17401.70 17403.27 15195.99 
Prob.> Chi2  0 0 0 0 0 
# of obs.  5,810 5,810 6,254 6,254 5,697 
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Table 5 
Option Backdating and Calendar-Time Fama-French Four-Factor Model Abnormal Returns 
This table reports calendar-time abnormal returns using the Fama-French four-factor model as follows,  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 −𝑅𝑡
𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ �𝑅𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑟−𝑅𝑡𝑓� + 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖 ∗ 𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where Ri is the equal-weighted portfolio i return, Rf is the risk-free rate (one month Treasury bill rate), Rmar is the 
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return, SMB is the return of a portfolio of small stocks minus the return of a 
portfolio of large stocks, HML is the return of a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return of a 
portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, and WML is the return of a portfolio of high momentum stocks (winner) 
minus the return of a portfolio of low momentum stocks (loser). An option grant is assumed to be backdated when 
its value of AR(+1,+20)-AR(-20,-2) is ranked among the top 10% of all sample grants, under the condition that its 
AR(-20,-2) is negative and AR(+1,+20) is positive. Each month we form portfolios consisting of all grants (grant-
based portfolio) that have been issued and of all firms (firm-based portfolio) that have issued a grant within the last 
n years (where n is the length of the holding period). Portfolio returns are equally weighted. Abnormal returns are 
given by the intercept when excess portfolio returns are regressed on the four Fama-French factors. T-statistics are 
in parentheses, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
Abnormal Returns Grant-Based Portfolio  Firm-Based Portfolio 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year  1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 
Non-Backdated Options (1) 0.003*  0.003** 0.010*  0.003*  0.003**  0.002*** (1.97) (2.35) (1.66)  (1.83) (2.63) (2.84) 
Backdated Options (2) 0.004  0.005* 0.009   0.004  0.004* 0.002  (1.16) (1.89) (1.36)  (1.32) (1.79) (1.38) 
        
Excess Abnormal Return 
(2)-(1) 
0.000  0.002  -0.001   0.001  0.002  -0.000  
(0.14) (0.81) (-0.11)  (0.34) (0.64) (-0.07) 
 
 
 
 
